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This paper investigates the influence of performance related pay on several dimensions of job 
satisfaction. In cross-sectional estimates, performance related pay is associated with increased 
overall satisfaction, satisfaction with pay, satisfaction with job security and satisfaction with 
hours. It appears to be negatively associated with satisfaction with the work itself. Yet, after 
accounting for worker fixed-effects, the positive associations remain and the negative association 
vanishes. These results appear robust to a variety of alternative specifications and support the 
notion that performance pay allows increased opportunities for worker optimization and do not 
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    The use of performance pay schemes by employers has been shown to increase worker 
productivity, effort and increase worker earnings (Lazear, 2000, Paarsch & Shearer 2000, Parent 
1999). However, it remains unclear a priori what effect performance pay schemes have on 
worker satisfaction with the job. While increased earnings will increase worker satisfaction, other 
aspects of performance pay schemes may have less beneficial effects on job satisfaction. Pay 
schemes based on performance may introduce large variations in periodic earnings reducing the 
utility of risk averse workers. The performance monitoring associated with pay schemes may 
result in increased effort that workers dislike. While some types of performance pay (such as 
profit sharing) may increase job security, others will increase earnings dispersion within the firm 
and may reduce perceptions of fairness or lower morale and motivation. In this way, performance 
pay schemes may increase worker satisfaction with pay, while reducing their satisfaction with 
other dimensions of the job such as effort, risk or perceived fairness.   
This paper presents evidence on the impact of performance pay schemes on job 
satisfaction in the United Kingdom. Specifically, we use the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) to investigate the impact of profit sharing, bonuses and performance pay on several 
dimensions of job satisfaction, including overall satisfaction, satisfaction with pay, with hours, 
with job security and with the work itself.  The paper provides the first evidence of the influence 
of performance pay schemes on many of these different aspects of job satisfaction. In traditional 
cross-section estimates, we demonstrate that performance related pay schemes are positively 
related to satisfaction with pay, to satisfaction with job security and to a lesser extent with 
satisfaction with hours and overall satisfaction. Performance related pay schemes appear 
negatively related to satisfaction with the work itself. Next, we utilize the panel nature of the 
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BHPS and demonstrate that controlling for individual fixed effects confirms the positive 
influences of performance pay. Including the fixed effects, profit sharing and/or performance pay 
remain associated with higher satisfaction overall, with pay, with job security and with hours.  
The negative influence on satisfaction with the work itself vanishes in the fixed effect estimates. 
A series of robustness checks confirm these general patterns but show that results vary by gender 
and by union status. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview of evidence on 
the effect of payment schemes on worker outcomes with specific attention to job satisfaction. 
Section II describes the data source and empirical methodology. Section IV presents the central 
econometric results contrasting the cross section and fixed-effect estimates.  Section V describes 
robustness checks and presents results within several subsamples.  The final section concludes. 
 
I. PAST THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
Payment schemes are seen as more closely aligning the interests of workers and firms. 
The critical characteristic of linking effort and pay allows a more complete optimisation by 
workers than is possible with time rates (Heywood and Wei 2006). In the extreme, workers paid 
piece rates or commissions equate the marginal cost of effort with the marginal value added (See 
Lazear, 1995).  The infra-marginal effort brought forth by the piece rate generates worker 
earnings above the cost of effort. While this generates the maximum surplus for workers, workers 
paid time rates stop short of the optimal effort, failing to produce units that generate value added 
greater than effort.  Thus, many studies confirm that those on piece rates increase effort and earn 
more than otherwise equivalent workers on time rates (Ewing, 1996; Lazear 2000; Oettinger, 
2001; Parent 1999).1 The ability to more fully optimise should make workers more satisfied, all 
else equal.  
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Yet, all else may not be equal. Some factors may further increase the satisfaction 
associated with performance pay. Brown and Sessions (2003) suggest that workers prefer 
employment environments seen as rewarding their productivity and that such environments 
increase worker optimism about future employment. In addition, some types of performance pay 
may be part of a bundle of HRM innovations associated with high performance workplaces. Such 
workplaces may create greater feelings of belonging, esteem and commitment. Goddard (2001) 
and Baurer (2004) present evidence on the association between job satisfaction and high 
performance workplaces.   
There exist a number of reasons, however, why performance related pay may reduce job 
satisfaction. First, performance pay may not be successful.  Evaluations may be overly subjective 
or objective measures of performance may be poorly tied to actual firm profit.  In theses cases, 
overall surplus may not be increased as workers try to maximize an objective such as the favour 
of their supervisor or the number of pieces produced (Baker 1992).  In this second case, workers 
may increase productivity in response to piece rates but not increase profitability as, for instance, 
quality falls, maintenance deteriorates, or injuries increase (Freeman and Kleiner 2005).  
Similarly, schemes that rely on a supervisor's evaluation are known to suffer from a variety of 
biases that may cause them to fail to increase surplus (Prendergast 1999).  Some schemes have 
also been shown to undermine valuable teamwork and cooperation (Drago and Garvey 1998).  
Schemes with such malfunctioning characteristics might well be anticipated to lower worker 
satisfaction. 
Second, Gibbons (1987) formalized the traditional union fear that 'ratcheting' would lower 
rewards and incentives after workers respond with additional effort.  Certainly Green (2004) has 
shown that the use of performance pay is associated with work intensification in Britain. Case 
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studies of call centres by Drago (1996) and Fernie and Metcalf (1999) present bleak pictures of 
low wages and high stress made worse by computerized monitoring and piece rates. Thus, 
performance pay may be merely a disciplinary tool that doesn't allow greater optimisation but 
merely increases work effort and lowers satisfaction especially for the low skilled (For more on 
the consequences for the low skilled see McCausland et al. 2005).  Even group schemes and 
profit sharing designed to change workplace norms may increase not only effort and earnings but 
also peer-pressure.  Kandel and Lazear (1992) emphasize that this peer-pressure can be so severe 
as to actually lower worker utility (job satisfaction) even as earnings rise. 
Third, workers may suffer reduced satisfaction from the increased earnings risk associated 
with performance pay schemes that may not be fully built into compensating wage demands 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Moreover, typical job satisfaction estimates hold constant earnings 
suggesting that the direct negative effect of the earnings risk may be reflected in lower 
satisfaction. Yet, the role of sorting by risk can be critical.  Sliwka and Grund (2006) have shown 
that workers who have a greater tolerance for risk are significantly more likely to choose jobs 
receiving performance pay.  Thus, the fact that performance pay is associated with greater 
earnings risk need not imply that the workers receiving performance pay are less satisfied with 
their earnings risk.  Moreover, a counterbalance to this increased risk occurs when the variation 
in workers payments matches that of firm performance. Thus, profit sharing has been recognized 
as increasing the job security of workers because worker payments fall during times of low 
profitability, which reduces the chance of layoff (see Wetizman 1984 and Kruse 1993). Thus, 
profit sharing may simultaneously increase earnings risk but reduce the likelihood of job loss.   
Fourth, greater pay dispersion typically results from individual performance pay schemes 
and Kennedy (1995) shows that such schemes reduce the morale of the least productive workers 
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and reduce their effort (productivity).  Indeed, his model shows that this effect can be sufficient 
to overwhelm the effort increase among the most productive and actually lower average 
productivity compared with using time rates. In studying the implementation of performance pay 
Marsden et al. (2001) show statistical evidence of just such reductions in productivity among 
those with low performance pay increments.  This they say is combined with the "demotivating 
effect arising from difficulties of measuring and evaluating performance fairly." Personnel 
management texts routinely stress that avoiding excessively inequitable pay rates is important in 
creating harmony and productivity (see the studies cited in Akerlof and Yellen, 1988).   Brown 
(2001) demonstrates that workers who believe their payment methods are 'fair' report higher 
satisfaction with their pay. Thus, regardless of the influence on total surplus, it is possible that 
some types of performance pay will be perceived as unfair reducing job satisfaction. 
Finally, Frey and Jegen (2001) review the literature showing that extrinsic incentives such 
as performance pay can crowd out intrinsic motivation to do a good job.  Again, they claim this 
crowding effect can actually dominate the traditional effect resulting in lower utility and 
productivity.  Even if it does not dominate the traditional effect, it may show up in reduced 
satisfaction with intrinsic aspects of the job such as satisfaction with the job itself.  Thus, the 
influence of performance pay on job satisfaction cannot be determined by theory.  To the extent 
that it allows better optimisation and an increase in surplus it should increase satisfaction.  Yet, 
influences on risk, effort, morale and intrinsic satisfaction could reverse this suggestion.  
Understanding the net influence of performance pay on job satisfaction remains important as job 
satisfaction has been shown to be closely correlated with both worker effort and with the 
intention to quit (Clark 2001). 
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Two papers directly estimate the impact of performance pay schemes on over all job 
satisfaction.  McCausland et al. (2005) use waves 8 – 11 of the BHPS to contrast the pay 
satisfaction of those receiving performance pay compared to those not receiving performance 
pay.  They use an econometric framework that endogenizes wages and accounts for self-selection 
into method of pay.  They show that for more highly paid workers satisfaction with the job and 
with pay both are higher under performance pay.  On the other hand, for lower paid workers 
satisfaction is lower under performance pay.  They suggest that the difference between the two 
groups of workers may result if lower paid workers are more likely to see performance pay as a 
form of monitoring or control. While this certainly follows, it may also be the result of the 
demotivation of lower ability workers modelled by Kennedy (1995) and observed by Marsden et 
al (2001). 
Two additional points deserve notice. First, that the definition of performance pay 
adopted by McCausland et al. (2005) does not include profit sharing.  Indeed, because profit 
sharing is asked as a separate question on payment method in the BHPS, estimating the 
determinants of performance related pay versus all other methods would include profit sharing 
among the base group of other methods.  If some of the influences of profit sharing and other 
performance related pay are similar, they could be obscured as a consequence. Second, while the 
BHPS examined fewer dimensions of job satisfaction by wave 8, it continues to examine several 
beyond overall job satisfaction and satisfaction with pay.2  While not the focus of the study by 
McCausland et al, using these dimensions might help examine some of the conflicting theories 
described above.  For instance, satisfaction with job security might be useful in unravelling the 
role of performance pay on risk and so on satisfaction. 
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Heywood and Wei (2006) use the National Longitudinal Study of Youth to examine the 
influence of both profit sharing and individual performance pay in the United States.  They show 
that both profit sharing and individual performance pay are associated with greater job 
satisfaction and greater satisfaction with pay. Profit sharing is also associated with greater 
satisfaction with the worker's supervisor. Interestingly, within the measure of individual 
performance pay there is a suggestion that piece rates may reduce overall satisfaction even as it 
increases satisfaction with pay. Neither the broad measure of individual performance pay nor 
profit sharing were correlated with satisfaction with co-workers although studies of German 
workers (Heywood et al 2005a, 2005b) show that profit sharing tends to positively influence 
satisfaction with both supervisors and with co-workers.  While these studies control for earnings, 
they do not try to correct for selection. 
In what follows, we return to the BHPS to examine the determinants of job satisfaction.  
We examine those determinants for all of the dimensions of job satisfaction available in the data 
and simultaneously examine the influence of both performance pay and profit sharing. 
 
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
     The data used in this paper is drawn from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). 
The BHPS is a nationally representative sample that each year interviews approximately 10,000 
individuals from roughly 5,500 households (McCausland et al 2005). We use the waves of the 
BHPS corresponding to 1998-2004, as earlier waves do not contain information on pay schemes. 
We restrict our sample to those individuals aged 20 to 65 and who are employees. This yields an 
unbalanced panel of 11,849 individuals. 
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     The information on payment schemes in the BHPS is available for 1998 onwards and the 
questions asked are, "have you received any bonuses such as a Christmas or quarterly bonus, 
profit-related pay or profit sharing bonus, or an occasional commission?", this excludes overtime 
payments; and "Does your pay include performance related pay" (Taylor et al, 2006). From these 
two questions, we create three mutually exclusive variables, the individual received profit 
shares/bonuses only, the individual received performance related pay only or the individual 
received both profit shares/bonuses and performance pay. Our data does not identify the 
proportion of earnings attributable to different pay schemes, a limitation shared with most 
individual and establishment data sets (see Heywood et al, 1998). 
INSERT TABLE 1 
       All job satisfaction questions in the BHPS are reported on a 7 value Likert scale, 1 being 
the least satisfied, 7 the most satisfied. At different times a variety of job satisfaction questions 
have been included in the BHPS but for the period in which pay scheme information is available, 
five job satisfaction questions are available. These include overall job satisfaction, satisfaction 
with pay, satisfaction with hours worked, satisfaction with job security, and satisfaction with the 
work itself. Table 1 provides mean job satisfaction levels for these five categories, disaggregated 
by the type of pay scheme. For brevity and to avoid double counting individuals, we report these 
for the 1998 sample only.3 
     Overall job satisfaction is highest for those who do not receive any form of performance 
pay or profit sharing/bonuses and next highest for those who receive profit sharing or bonuses 
only. Satisfaction with pay is the highest and nearly identical for those both receiving profit 
sharing/bonuses only and those receiving these in conjunction with performance pay.  
Performance pay only appears to be associated with lower levels of satisfaction with security. In 
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general, the pattern of unconditional means reported in Table 1 does not appear to support a 
strong link between job satisfaction and performance pay schemes. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 Table 2 presents the correlations between the five measures of job satisfaction. While the 
correlations between overall job satisfaction and the other dimensions are reasonably large, the 
correlations among those other dimensions are sufficiently small to indicate that they measure 
different aspects of satisfaction.  Thus it makes sense from a statistical, as well as a theoretical, 
point of view to separately estimate the determinants of the individual dimensions.4 
A number of variables are available in the BHPS that allow us to control for other sources 
of variation in work conditions, many of which we would expect to influence job satisfaction. 
Thus, we observe the workers pay rate (log pay), the number of hours worked and whether they 
worked overtime. When estimating the impact of performance pay schemes on job satisfaction it 
is important to control for these factors as, from the discussion in the previous section, we would 
expect these to vary with pay scheme. Other included variables related to job characteristics are 
whether the individual had a work pension, whether the employer provided health insurance, 
whether the employer provided training, whether the individual was promoted in the last year, are 
they on a temporary contract, do they have a management or supervisory role, and size of the 
firm.  
INSERT TABLE 3 
Table 3 presents sample means and standard deviations of the independent variables. The 
variables included are largely standard in the literature on job satisfaction. Again for brevity, 
sample means for the first wave used (1998) are presented, full pooled (i.e. multiple individual-
time observations) sample means are presented in the appendix as table A2. The variables include 
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the controls for work conditions listed above along with gender, whether the respondent is in a 
union and whether the respondent has a disability. Also included, but not reported in the sample 
means, are 10 controls for industry, 9 controls for occupation and 11 controls for region. 
Following past research, the values of job satisfaction are fitted to the cumulative normal 
distribution through ordered probit estimates (see Clark and Oswald, 1996 and Clark et al 1997 
among others). The ordered probit estimation follows appropriately when the dependent variable 
has a natural ordering, such as least to most satisfied (see McKelvey and Zavonia 1975). 
 
III. CENTRAL RESULTS 
INSERT TABLE 4 
Table 4 presents estimates of job satisfaction using data pooled for 1998-2004, with 
standard errors clustered at the individual level.  Column 2 provides estimates for overall job 
satisfaction. Estimates for controls are largely as demonstrated in previous research. Job 
satisfaction declines with education level and firm size. Union members are less satisfied, while 
public sector workers are more satisfied with their job. Females appear to have markedly higher 
job satisfaction than males confirming past findings of the "paradox of the contented female 
worker."  
In terms of performance pay measures, only those receiving profit sharing or bonuses 
only have a significantly higher level of overall job satisfaction. Columns 3 to 6, display 
covariate estimates for the various dimensions of job satisfaction reported in the BHPS for 1998 
to 2004. As might be expected performance pay measures are associated with increases in 
worker’s satisfaction with their pay.  As we control for the level of pay, this result goes beyond 
the recognized influence that performance pay has in increasing earnings and is consistent with 
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an improved ability to more nearly optimize the trade-off of effort and earnings. There is also an 
indication that profit sharing or bonuses are associated with higher levels of satisfaction with 
work hours. Again, work hours are accounted for and as anticipated workers have lower 
satisfaction with their hours of work when those hours are greater.  The point is that holding the 
hours of work constant those who receive profit shares or bonuses report greater satisfaction with 
their hours.  Taken together, these two results do suggest that profit sharing or bonus schemes 
allow workers to choose effort and pay combinations more in line with their preferences and so 
generate greater job satisfaction.  
We suggested conflicting theoretical influences upon satisfaction with job security. Profit 
sharing has been recognized to create greater job security by reducing marginal costs of 
employment when profits are low.  This seems born out by the highly significant and large 
influence of profit sharing on greater job satisfaction with security. The influence of performance 
pay is less clear.  An emphasis on output-based measures might imply a greater chance of being 
fired based on under-performance. On the other hand, the ability to avoid being fired may more 
nearly be in the hands of workers who can influence their output. Importantly, we also know that 
workers with less aversion to risk sort into jobs with performance related pay. Column 6 shows 
that performance related pay is associated with greater satisfaction with job security, albeit only 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
Finally, there appears to be a weakly significant negative effect of performance pay on 
satisfaction with the job itself.  As this estimate also holds constant pay, it may reflect the 
tendency of performance pay schemes to crowd out intrinsic satisfaction. Alternatively, it may 
reflect the tendency for jobs that are easily monitored and paid by performance to be simple and 
repetitive (MacLeod and Parent 1999). Nonetheless, this one result does not change the overall 
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pattern that performance pay and profit sharing tend to have positive influences across a variety 
of dimensions of job satisfaction. 
INSERT TABLE 5 
Not only do the performance pay variables generate a series of statistically significant 
coefficients but the magnitudes of the effects are also important.  In Table 5 the marginal effects 
on the probability of reporting the highest level of satisfaction are reported for each of 
dimensions of job satisfaction.5 Thus, the first entry indicates that receiving only profit 
sharing/bonuses increases the likelihood of being in the most satisfied category by one percentage 
point.  This is not a small effect as the mean level is around 11 percent.  Thus, a one percentage 
point increase represents an increase of 1/11th relative to the mean or a finding that those 
receiving profit sharing/bonuses are 9 percent more likely to report being in the most satisfied 
category.  The magnitudes for the other payment schemes and dimensions vary but are largest for 
pay and for job security. 
The estimates presented so far have assumed that individuals are randomly assigned into 
different pay schemes. There is evidence, however, that this is not the case (McCausland et al 
2005). Lazear (2000) suggests that 56 percent of the increase in productivity associated with one 
form of performance related pay, piece rates, is associated with the sorting of inherently more 
productive workers into firms operating these type of pay schemes. In the context of this paper, 
this is important insofar as any estimated effect of performance related pay on job satisfaction 
may merely reflect the sorting of workers with preferences for performance related pay to these 
type of jobs. In particular, if more productive workers are more satisfied under any pay setting 
but are attracted to performance pay settings as Lazear suggests than the apparent influence of 
performance pay on satisfaction would be misleading.   
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The suggestion that fixed effects can be critical in estimating job satisfaction has been 
confirmed by Heywood et al (2002) who showed that the dissatisfaction of union workers with 
their pay in a cross-section is eliminated in fixed-effect estimates that concentrate on workers 
changing union status.  Such fixed effects may also influence the cross-sectional estimates for the 
facets reported in Table 3.  Thus, fixed effects will largely hold constant risk aversion allowing 
the actual role of performance pay on satisfaction with security to emerge.  Similarly, the 
unmeasured skills of workers limited to routine and easily monitored jobs can be held constant to 
focus on the actual role of performance pay on satisfaction with the job itself.  In essence, the 
panel estimates remove the role of sorting by unmeasured worker fixed effects. 
To control for unobserved worker specific effects on job satisfaction we estimate fixed-
effects ordered probits using the within worker variation across the 7 waves.6   The specification 
used in Table 4 is again used but obviously time invariant worker characteristics (such as gender) 
will necessarily be omitted from the estimation.  
INSERT TABLE 6 
Table 6 provides the fixed effects estimates of job satisfaction. They generally support the 
earlier estimates and for brevity only the coefficients for the pay scheme type are reported. 
Column 2 confirms the earlier reported significant positive effect of profit sharing/bonuses on 
overall job satisfaction. Moreover, all three of the indicators of payment schemes remain positive 
and significant indicators of satisfaction with pay and satisfaction with job security as they did in 
the cross-section.  Thus, risk sorting does not appear to be driving the job security results in the 
cross-section. In the cross-sectional estimates both performance pay and profit sharing/bonuses 
positively influenced satisfaction with hours. Controlling for individual fixed effects, they remain 
positive but now it is the coefficient on performance pay schemes that reaches statistical 
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significance.  The previously negative influence of performance pay on satisfaction with the work 
itself is not apparent in the fixed effects estimate. Such a pattern is consistent with the conjecture 
that workers who are subject to certain types of performance pay (such as piece rates) may be 
limited to jobs that tend to be more repetitive and simple and that once these fixed effects are 
held constant, the nature of the payment schemes does not play an independent role. 
In total, these results suggest two specific points.  First, performance related pay schemes 
are significant determinants of several different aspects of job satisfaction. Second, estimates of 
the influence of pay schemes on job satisfaction which fail to control for individual specific 
effects may misrepresent the influence on a number of these aspects.  
More generally, the results provide no evidence that performance pay schemes demotivate 
workers, lower morale or crowd out intrinsic motivation.  While these things may happen in 
specific cases, they are certainly not sufficiently general to lower any of the dimensions of job 
satisfaction.  Instead, the bulk of the evidence would be consistent with performance pay 
improving opportunities to optimise effort and reward trade-offs, improving senses of fairness in 
rewards or the efficacy of effort and improving job security.  In this sense, the results provide 
important corroboration of those of Heywood and Wei (2006) and of McCausland et al. (2005) 
who found important positive effects of performance pay on satisfaction but found them for more 
general measures of satisfaction (fewer dimensions) and for more limited samples (only the more 
highly paid). 
 
IV. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND SUBSAMPLE RESULTS 
Before moving on to specific checks and subsamples, we emphasize a general result. All 
of the estimates of the influence of performance related pay schemes on all dimensions of job 
 15
satisfaction are robust to the exclusion of controls for hours worked (and overtime) and pay. 
While hours itself often matters for satisfaction, it does not interact with performance related pay 
in a fashion that alters the results reported in the previous section.  This invariance goes, in part, 
to the issue of whether longer hours are associated with payment schemes and so might lower 
satisfaction.  We found no evidence of such a suggestion.  Performance related pay is known to 
increase earnings and one might argue that this influence should not be held constant in 
examining the influence of performance related pay on satisfaction. Indeed, the size and 
significance of the coefficients remain at least as large excluding earnings as a determinant of 
satisfaction.  
McCausland et al (2005) claim that for lower paid workers performance pay schemes 
merely act as a discipline and monitoring device, and as a result performance pay reduces job 
satisfaction for this group. We examine this contention by splitting the sample according to wage. 
Specifically, we stratify the sample by whether the worker was above or below the median wage 
in the sample for each year. We then estimate fixed effects models of all dimensions of job 
satisfaction for the lower income panel. These estimates (available upon request) indicate that 
pay schemes have no significant impact on overall job satisfaction for these workers. Despite the 
reduced sample size, all three categories of pay schemes remain associated with increased job 
satisfaction with pay (even holding pay constant in the estimates).  Moreover, profit sharing 
remains associated with significantly increased satisfaction with job security. Interestingly, profit 
sharing is associated with significantly reduced satisfaction with the job itself. This is surprising 
as one might anticipate this to come from the higher-powered performance pay schemes and may 
flow from the class of jobs in which profit sharing is offered to lower paid workers. In total, these 
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results are not suggestive of overall negative effects on morale or motivation of performance 
related pay schemes for low paid workers.   
A further factor to consider when examining the role of performance related pay schemes 
on satisfaction with hours worked is that this may vary markedly by worker’s skill level. For 
instance, Drago (1996) and Fernie and Metcalf (1999) illustrate the negative effect of piece rates 
on worker morale in call centres. We examine such claims by estimating the model for 
satisfaction with hours worked separately for low skill workers. There are two main ways one 
might think of identifying low skill workers in our data. First, we could focus on workers with 
low education levels. Estimates based on samples of workers without a-levels (n=22,047), or 
workers without post-school qualifications (n=31,451) reveal no systematic effect of performance 
pay schemes on satisfaction with hours worked. Second, we look at workers in low-skill 
occupations by identifying workers in the three lowest skilled occupational groups (sales and 
customer service occupations; process, plant and machine operatives; and elementary 
occupations). Again estimates based on this sample (n=8864) show no statistically significant 
relationship between satisfaction with hours and performance related pay schemes.  
INSERT TABLE 7 
In light of the large variations in job satisfaction by both gender and union status 
displayed in Table 4, it is worth considering whether there are variations in the impact of 
performance related pay on job satisfaction across both these groups. Table 7 provides estimates 
of the impact of performance related pay on job satisfaction split by gender and union 
membership, respectively. In both cases all controls are as Table 4 and in addition controls for 
individual fixed effects are included. 
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  The results stratified by gender reveal a few differences. First, profit sharing increases job 
satisfaction for men, but not women. Performance pay has a positive effect on job satisfaction 
with hours, pay and job security for men, but only the pay effect is apparent for women. Profit 
sharing increases satisfaction with pay and job security for men, but only job security for women. 
Together these results suggest that performance related pay schemes are more beneficial for men. 
To the extent that such schemes create increased competition and rivalry within the workplace, 
this might be anticipated based on several experiments showing that competition improves the 
performance of males but not of females (Gneezy and Rustichini 2004). 
The results in the second panel demonstrate that there are marked differences between 
union and non-union workers in terms of the effect of performance related pay schemes on job 
satisfaction. For instance, profit sharing increases the latent measure of overall job satisfaction by 
almost 0.13 for union workers, while receiving both profit shares and performance pay increases 
the latent measure of job satisfaction by 0.12. For non-union workers no such effects are 
noticeable, while only performance pay increases their overall job satisfaction.  Performance 
related pay schemes increase satisfaction with pay for both groups, but the magnitude of the 
effect is much larger for union workers who receive only performance pay or in conjunction with 
profit sharing.  Performance pay increases satisfaction with hours for unionized workers, while 
profit shares increase satisfaction with security for non-union workers.  
The remarkably strong role for performance pay among unionized workers may at first 
blush seem surprising.  Unions are presumed to oppose individual performance pay because it 
hurts the solidarity wage and increases earnings dispersion among workers doing the same job 
(Issac 2001).  At the same time, unions are presumed to oppose explicit profit sharing as it 
replaces the implicit profit sharing that takes place during bargaining (Drago and Heywood 
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1995).  Yet, the international evidence on the association between unions and performance pay is 
best described as inconclusive.  Moreover, US and Canadian evidence suggests that when unions 
are involved in the creation and implementation of performance pay schemes, the schemes are 
associated with better firm performance and greater longevity (Kim and Voos 1997; Kim 1999).  
German evidence makes clear that active involvement by organized labor (in the form of works 
councils) actually increases the chance of a firm adopting performance pay (Heywood et al. 
1998).  Thus, the finding that performance pay is associated with increased job satisfaction for 
union members may not be paradoxical if the schemes in the union sector are more likely to be 
both accepted by workers and successful because of their role in its creation.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper aimed to estimate the impact of performance pay schemes on a number of 
dimensions of job satisfaction. We have provided evidence that profit sharing/bonuses tend to 
increase overall job satisfaction. Overall, performance related pay increases satisfaction with both 
pay and job security. The latter finding is not necessarily intuitive. Performance related pay may 
decrease job security insofar as it is indicative of a culture of monitoring of work effort. 
Conversely, linking pay to productivity may increase job security as wages fluctuate positively 
with the output of the firm (Weitzman 1984, Kruse 1993), reducing the need for firms to lay-off 
workers in periods of weak product demand.  It may also attract workers who are willing to 
tolerate risk and so are no less likely to be satisfied with their degree of security. Our findings 
suggest that the latter two suggestions dominate. 
A concern with performance related pay is that it can lead to work intensification (Green 
2004), and in turn this may lead to dissatisfaction with hours worked. In this study we find no 
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evidence of performance related pay adversely affecting satisfaction with hours worked, even for 
low skilled workers whom it has been suggested are adversely affected by performance pay 
schemes. Indeed, in the fixed effect estimates we found evidence of greater satisfaction with 
hours among those receiving performance pay.   
A related concern is that the explicit incentives of performance related pay may crowd out 
intrinsic motivations.  In the cross section estimates there was, indeed, a suggestion that 
performance related pay was associated with reduced satisfaction with the job itself.  Yet, the 
fixed effects estimates revealed this was the result of sorting as the association did not persist.  
Thus, we remain unable to confirm any negative influences of performance pay on job 
satisfaction and unable to dislodge a series of positive influences. 
Several caveats also remain.  First, these general tendencies do not mean that the job 
satisfaction of all workers will increase should their firm adopt performance pay.   By its nature 
performance pay is suited for some types of production technologies and not suited for others.  
Thus, we emphasized in our early discussion that performance pay can, in some circumstances, 
be counter-productive and decrease surplus (Freeman and Kleiner 2005).  It makes sense that 
workers in such cases may not have increased satisfaction.  Second, other dimensions of job 
satisfaction may still present negative correlations.  Satisfaction with management, coworkers or 
stress may all be lowered by performance pay.  We simply don't have access to those dimensions 
in our data.  Finally, we recognize that our measures of performance pay may aggregate 
individual practices that have off setting influences.  Thus, piece rates may lower satisfaction 
even as earnings based on a broader formal appraisal increase satisfaction.  We cannot identify 
whether or not such differences exist.  Despite these caveats, the many suggestions that worker 
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TABLE 1 Summary Statistics, Pay Scheme and Job Satisfaction, Employees Age 20-65, 
1998 
 Overall  Pay Hours Security Work Itself 
Base (2569) 5.33 4.88 5.17 5.36 5.43 
Profit Sharing/Bonuses Only 
 (996) 
5.31 5.02 5.08 5.48 5.38 
 
Performance Pay Only (332) 5.21 4.89 5.26 5.19 5.37 
Profit Sharing/Bonuses and  
Performance Pay (502)  
5.20 5.03 5.00 5.35 5.23 
Individuals 4,399     
 







TABLE 2 Correlations Between Different Dimensions of Job Satisfaction, 1998-2004. 
 
 Overall Hours Pay Work Itself 
Overall      
Hours 0.511    
Pay 0.483 0.345   
Work Itself  0.701 0.430 0.340
Job Security 0.423 0.251 0.292 0.295
Source: BHPS. 
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TABLE 3 Summary Statistics, Employees Aged 20-65, 1998. 
Variables Mean Std Dev 
Profit Sharing/Bonuses Only 0.226  
Performance Pay Only 0.075  
Profit Sharing/Bonuses and Performance Pay 0.114  
Male 0.511  
Age (years) 38.060 10.981 
Tenure  12.179 7.845 
Married 0.582  
Highest Level of Education:   
< A-Level 0.541  
A-Level 0.216  
Diploma 0.085  
Degree 0.129  
Higher Degree 0.029  
Log Pay 6.174 0.990 
Normal Hours Worked 35.907 9.327 
Union Member 0.319  
Public Sector Worker 0.303  
Temporary Job 0.050  
Manager/Supervisor 0.394  
Promoted in Last Year 0.075  
Pension 0.553  
Employer Provided Health Insurance 0.104  
Employer Provided Training 0.210  
Firm Size: 1-24 workers 0.320  
25-99 workers 0.264  
100-499 workers 0.247  
500 workers plus 0.169  





TABLE 4 Dimensions of Job Satisfaction, Covariate Estimates 1998-2004. 
 Overall 
 
Hours      Pay Work Itself      Job Security 


















































































































































































































































































Pseudo r2 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 
 
0.03
Observations 43,215  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are standard 







TABLE 5 Marginal Effects on the Probability of Being in the Most Satisfied Category, 1998-2004. 
 






































Proportion of Sample in 












*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  






TABLE 6 Performance Related Pay and Job Satisfaction, Fixed Effects Estimates 1998-2004. 
 
 Overall Hours Pay Work Itself Job Security 

































Log Likelihood -44278.33  -49205.32  -50139.67 -45555.64        -47202.85  
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  




Table 7 Performance Related Pay, Job Satisfaction by Gender and Union Status 1998-2004, Fixed Effect Estimates 
 Overall Hours Pay Work Itself Job Security 
 







0.031     
(0.027) 
0.016   
(0.032) 
   0.116*    
(0.027) 
0.071**   
(0.031) 




  0.119*   
(0.027) 
0.112*   
(0.033) 








  0.190*   . 
(0.042) 
0.129*   
(0.046) 
0.022   
 (0.042) 
0.068  











-0.039   
.(0.037) 




0.133*   
(0.047) 
-0.048   
(0.039) 




0.123*   
(0.048) 
Observations 21,286 21,928         








(0.047)   
0.030 
(0.025) 
0.022    
(0.036) 










0.021   
(0.046) 
0.141*   
(0.025) 
Performance Pay Only 0.050   
(0.052) 
  0.117*  
(0.044) 




  0.283*   
(0.052) 
0.128*   
(0.042) 
0.078   
(0.052) 
0.069    
(0.043) 
0.149*   
(0.052) 
   0.093**   
(0.040) 
Profit Sharing/Bonuses 
and Performance Pay 
0.120** 
(0.060)   
-0.012   
(0.037) 
  0.073   
(0.059) 
-0.053   
(0.035) 
0.295**   
(0.059) 
 0.049   
(0.035) 
0.045   
(0.059) 
-0.022   
(0.037) 
0.218*   
(0.059) 
0.145*   
(0.037) 
Observations 14,478 25,737         
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The specification includes all variables 





Appendix A1 – Summary Statistics, Pay Scheme and Job Satisfaction, Employees Age 20-65 
1998-2004 
 Overall  Pay Hours Security Work Itself 
Base (27100) 5.35 4.86 5.23 5.43 5.45 
Profit Sharing/Bonuses Only 
(9318) 
5.35 5.02 5.16 5.54 5.39 
 
Performance Pay Only (2865) 5.30 4.98 5.15 5.53 5.34 
Profit Sharing/Bonuses and  
Performance Pay (3539)  
5.25 5.08 5.04 5.43 5.32 
Sample Size 43,215     
 
Source: BHPS. Job satisfaction reported on 1-7 Likert scale.  
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Appendix A2 – Sample Statistics, Employees Aged 20-65, 1998-2004. 
Variables Mean Std Dev 
Profit Sharing/Bonuses Only 0.216  
Performance Pay Only 0.066  
Profit Sharing/Bonuses and Performance Pay 0.089  
Male 0.493  
Age (years) 38.864 11.056 
Tenure  11.694 7.458 
Married 0.579  
Highest Level of Education:   
< A-Level 0.510  
A-Level 0.218  
Diploma 0.089  
Degree 0.146  
Higher Degree 0.037  
Log Pay 6.047 0.953 
Normal Hours Worked 35.221 9.561 
Union Member 0.335  
Public Sector Worker 0.341  
Temporary Job 0.042  
Manager/Supervisor 0.382  
Promoted in Last Year 0.065  
Pension 0.565  
Employer Provided Health Insurance 0.090  
Employer Provided Training 0.198  
Firm Size: 1-24 workers 0.327  
25-99 workers 0.267  
100-499 workers 0.230  
500 workers plus 0.176  
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 This is not to say that in all circumstances piece rates automatically have this influence.  Inability to measure 
performance or incompatible managerial policies can, for instance, make piece rates unprofitable (Freeman and 
Kleiner 2005). 
2 Earlier waves also included questions on worker satisfaction with promotion prospects, relations with the boss and 
their use of initiative. 
3 Means for the full pooled sample covering 1998-2003 are reported in the appendix as Table A1. 
4 Indeed, one can use the Cronbach's alpha to show that the individual dimensions should not be aggregated to a 
single measure (Heywood et al. 2002). 
5 As there are seven satisfaction categories, three payment scheme variables and 5 dimensions of job satisfaction, we 
have not presented a full set of marginal effects but they are available from upon request. 
6 Specifically we estimate ordered probits with fixed effects in Limdep 8.0. 
 
